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BOILERPLATE  AND  CONSENT  

I

Nancy S. Kim†

MARGARET JANE RADIN’S BOOK, Boilerplate: The Fine Print,
Vanishing Rights, and the Rule of Law, Radin argues that boilerplate is a social problem leading to normative and democratic
degradation of important rights. Although practitioners typically refer to “boilerplate” as the miscellaneous, standardized provisions at the end of a contract, Radin uses the term to refer to “standardized form contracts” which “like the rigid metal used to construct
steam boilers in the past . . . cannot be altered.”1 Radin proposes an
analytical framework for evaluating boilerplate and a bold panoply
of alternatives to contract law to deal with the problem of boilerplate which includes private and public approaches, and a novel use
of tort law to deter the most egregious rights-deleting terms.2
In his review of Radin’s book, Omri Ben-Shahar outlines two
approaches to regulation by boilerplate.3 He labels the first as “autonomism,” which asks “how such one-sided dictation of terms by
firms fits within a liberal account of good social order, of democratic
N
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Nancy Kim is a Professor of Law at California Western School of Law and the author of WRAP
CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (Oxford 2013). © Nancy S. Kim, 2014.
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW (2013) at 8-9.
Id. at 154-242.
Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, available at papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2255161t 2 (forthcoming, Michigan Law
Review, 2013).
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control and participation, and of individual autonomy.” Ben-Shahar
views Radin as representative of the autonomists. The second way
of viewing regulation-by-boilerplate is “to ask how it affects the well
being and satisfaction of consumers who buy products co-packed
with boilerplate.” Ben-Shahar identifies himself with “boilerplate
apologists,” who are primarily concerned with “the substance of the
deal, its costs to consumers, the ease by which profitable deals are
formed, and the opportunities to realize benefits from trade” and
who are “largely numb to the inherent political value of private order, control, or ‘voice.’”
Ben-Shahar sets up the two camps in order to frame his critique.
But what he purports to accept as “the autonomists’ premise” – that
there is “something offensive about being bound to terms that you
did not know about” – is a belittling mischaracterization. Radin argues that some boilerplate strips consumers of important rights and
is socially harmful, not that it is “offensive.” By downgrading the
harm engendered by boilerplate from a rights violation to something
akin to elbows on the table, he dismisses Radin’s premise at the
same time that he purports to accept it. Ben-Shahar then reframes
the discussion as one about the economics of boilerplate instead of
Radin’s concern, which is the deletion of rights without consent,
and the deletion of rights which are market-inalienable or partially
market-inalienable.
According to Ben-Shahar, boilerplate apologists believe that
boilerplate is welfare-enhancing because it reduces transaction costs
and, presumably, prices. Therefore, he argues, boilerplate is what
consumers want anyway – a generalization that Radin disputes.4
More importantly, it ignores the larger questions raised by Radin’s
book regarding the limits of consent: Even assuming that consumers
want boilerplate, how much does that matter? Or, to put it differently, Are there limits to consent? Are there some things to which
we, as a civilized society, should not permit consumers to consent?
This Essay does not attempt to answer those questions. Rather, it
posits that they are unanswerable without a better, more nuanced
4

Radin devotes the entirety of chapter 6 to this issue. See Radin at 99-109.
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definition of consent – one that takes into account contracting realities such as contracting environment, contract presentment, the
nature of rights affected, and the burdens created by boilerplate.

C

I.  INFORMATION  AND  CONSENT  

onsent justifies judicial intervention into what is otherwise a
private affair. Without consent, state enforcement of contracts
amounts to state coercion. The central problem with regulation by
boilerplate is consent and the importance of certain rights that
should not be so easily waivable – or waivable at all. Radin cares
about consent. She also cares about the varieties of nonconsent. One
of those varieties, in addition to coercion and fraud, is sheer ignorance. There can be no consent – or there can only be nonconsent –
where there is coercion, fraud, or sheer ignorance. In the context of
boilerplate, it is sheer ignorance that rears its ugly head most often.
Radin states that sheer ignorance occurs “where a person’s entitlement is being divested, but the person does not know that it is happening, or indeed, that anything is happening.”5 Sheer ignorance is
characterized by an absence of information, and without information
a consumer cannot consent. As Radin notes, “for a consumer to make
a free choice, that consumer must have some level of information.”6
Another category of consent that Radin refers to, “problematic
consent,” results from decisionmaking impediments that prevent an
informed choice. In this situation, such as where a user clicks “I
agree” to the terms of use without reading them, she questions the
validity of the consent.7 Information asymmetry, which refers to
recipients of boilerplate having much less information than do the
firms that draft them, makes consent problematic.8 In addition, heuristic bias, which refers to the cognitive limitations or “bounded rationality” of human beings, impedes decisionmaking and renders
5
6
7
8

Id. at 21.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 24-25.
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consent problematic.9 Radin references the body of academic research and empirical studies that find that human beings are myopic
and less than perfectly rational.10
The existence of heuristic biases casts doubt on the possibility of
informed consent, which depends upon the consenter’s ability to
understand and assess risk. Radin argues that the fact that individuals
only at best pay attention to whatever seems salient to them at the
moment also means that certain rights that do not seem salient to
individuals – such as viable rights to redress of grievances – should
not be waivable on an individual-by-individual basis.
Ben-Shahar presents what he refers to as two myths pertaining to
boilerplate and sheer ignorance. The first myth is that “boilerplate is
more complex” than a simple agreement from a pre-boilerplate era.
Because such a simple agreement does not address many of the issues
addressed by boilerplate, it is subject to other legal sources such as
default rules, gap fillers, regulations, and local customers and market
norms. Thus, Ben-Shahar argues, the complexity of the simple
agreement “is probably greater, compared to boilerplate, because
the absence of a comprehensive sheet of terms opens the door for
various and overlapping supplementary sources.”11
But complexity by itself is not the problem; complexity is problematic when it obscures important information relevant to a party’s
decision. It vitiates consent when the party would have made a different decision if the party had known of the information. What
Ben-Shahar describes as the “complexity” of “supplementary
sources” such as default rules and norms is not necessarily a problem
for the non-drafting party because unlike boilerplate, supplementary
sources are typically crafted to reflect the intent of reasonable parties in similar situations. Boilerplate, on the other hand, tends to
favor the drafter and probably does not reflect the intent of the nondrafting party. Complexity matters to the nondrafting party if the
information that it contains harms her. It is irrelevant if it says what
9

Id. at 26.
Id. at 26-27.
11
Ben-Shahar at 5.
10
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she intends. Furthermore, as Radin argues, default rules represent
the past choices of legislatures and courts, and so at least have some
democratic basis.
The second myth, according to Ben-Shahar, is that “boilerplate can
be replaced with informed consent.” According to Ben-Shahar, this
is a myth because it is “the complexity of the decision that undermines the project of informed consent, not some technical failure in
the delivery template of the disclosure.” But in many cases, it is the
failure of the delivery template. Research shows that the nature of
disclosure matters a great deal in educating consumers. As Archon
Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil argue, “targeted transparency
policies succeed when they are user-centered.”12 For example, the star
rating system used to indicate the safety of sport utility vehicles
(SUVs) successfully educated consumers and led to safer SUV models.13 The disclosure system was effective both because the information was clearly communicated and the format was user-centered
and allowed easy comparisons among different auto makers.14
When critics of disclosure like Ben-Shahar argue that it doesn’t
“work,” what they really mean is that consumers fail to act differently
as a result of the disclosure. But as Fung, Graham, and Weil demonstrate, it is only some disclosure that doesn’t work.
Furthermore, consumer inaction stems from a variety of complex
causes, including heuristic biases. Collective action and coordination
problems also impede action. A lack of reasonable alternatives presents yet another obstacle for the consumer. Ben-Shahar assumes
competitive markets but as Radin notes, we cannot simply make
that assumption nor can we assume that, even given a competitive
market, we have not reached a “lemons equilibrium” where firms
compete “by offering their worst contract, not their best.”15

12

ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM AND DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY (2007).
13
Id. at 1-4.
14
Id. at 2-3.
15
See Radin at 109.
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Alternatives result from market competition and market competition arises from demand. This is how the issue of consumer choice
is affected by lack of transparency or ineffective disclosure. As Radin
argues, “Appropriate market functioning depends upon an acceptable
understanding of the basis of demand. A market is not functioning
properly if demand is based on completely erroneous notions about
what the product is.”16 If consumers don’t know about a harm, they
won’t complain about it or demand alternatives, and there will be
no market response to address that demand for alternatives. Effective
disclosure, however, has the potential to raise awareness and create
competition in the marketplace, such as with the star rating system
mentioned above, which made rollover safety a salient consumer
issue and, eventually, a competitive product feature.17
Disclosure won’t solve every instance of non-consent or problematic consent, but to dismiss it out of hand is an overreaction.
Boilerplate is easy to ignore because it is hard to find and harder to
understand. Would consumers care about arbitration if they had the
right kind of information, such as “From 2010-2013, 200 consumers
tried to sue us but were forced to arbitrate their claims. Of those
claims, consumers prevailed on only 2 out of 200.”? Maybe some
would, maybe some wouldn’t. Less probable is that they would
purchase goods from a website if they knew its terms of use contained the following provision:
You agree not to file or initiate any complaint, chargeback, dispute, public comment, forum post, website post, social media
post, or any claim related to any transaction with our website
and/or company. By using our website, making any purchase,
or conducting any transaction with us, you agree to all terms
and conditions stated herein. Any action in breach of this
16
17

Id. at 103.
Fung, Graham and Weil at 4 (noting that “SUV models had widely varying rollover rates – and most performed poorly. In 2001, thirty models received only one
or two stars, meaning that they had a greater than 30 percent chance of rolling
over, while only one model . . . . earned a four-star rating, meaning that it had a
less than 20 percent chance of rolling over. By 2005, however, only one model
. . . . received as few as two stars, while twenty-four models earned four stars.”)
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agreement that causes reversal of any payment in full or in part
shall result in a collections action for the full or partial order total (the amount reversed) plus an additional $50. You agree
that any breach of this agreement shall also constitute liability in
the amount of $200 plus any related costs directly or indirectly
relating from any such breach.18

Consumers don’t read boilerplate now, but that doesn’t mean
they won’t read any boilerplate in any form, ever. Ben-Shahar’s
claim of ineffectiveness merely absolves businesses of responsibility
for the lousy job they are currently doing with conveying information. To ignore or discount the potential of disclosure to remedy
informational asymmetries devalues the importance of consent. Disclosure requirements signalize that the quality of consent matters.
Even if an individual consumer fails to take advantage of the opportunity to review relevant information, it should not be up to the
drafting company to make the decision that the consumer will not do
so – and so not even bother to try to make the information readable.
If the vast majority of consumers ignore certain information,
there are two possibilities. Either the information is immaterial or
that information is not presented in a reasonable manner. Elsewhere, I have proposed that the courts adopt a “duty to draft reasonably.”19 Under the duty to draft reasonably, contract provisions
would be categorized based upon their function (shield, sword or
crook), with the taxonomy determining what type of information
should be disclosed and how consent should be manifested.20 If the
18

Terms of Use from Accessory Town, available at acctown.com/pages/terms.
NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013) at
176-192.
20
Id. at 44-52. “Shield” terms protect the company’s proprietary interests and do
not require the consumer’s consent. A business can, for example, unilaterally
limit the scope of a license term, forbid smoking in hotel rooms, and prohibit
bullying on its website. By contrast, “sword” provisions diminish consumers’
rights, such as the right to sue, or impose obligations, such as the obligation to pay
fees in addition to the purchase price. Consequently, they require the consumer’s
consent. The last category of terms, “crook” provisions, are terms that are not
obviously part of the bargain. Examples of crook provisions include terms that
claim a broad license to use personal information even though the website boasts
19
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vast majority of consumers fail to read important information, the
company has failed to meet the standard. Companies conduct focus
group testing as part of their marketing efforts – they should put
some of that skill and knowledge into testing the noticeability and
comprehensibility of their contract terms.

II.  TRANSPARENCY,  CHOICE  AND  COMPETITION  

R

adin’s proposed analytical framework consists of evaluating (i)
the nature of the right to determine whether it is one that is
alienable or whether it is market-inalienable; (ii) the quality of consent by the recipient; and (iii) where relevant, the extent of social
dissemination of the rights deletion.21 She proposes that “either nonconsent or market-inalienability will invalidate any purported contract, whether mass-market or not, whether boilerplate or not.”22
Ben-Shahar warns against the unintended consequences of Radin’s proposal. The first such unintended consequence is the “price
effect,” which is basically the effect that boilerplate deletion will
have upon the price consumers will be expected to pay. His assumption is that better terms will result in higher prices. Yet, there is no
evidence to support that any cost savings from the use of boilerplate
are passed on to consumers instead of pocketed by the company. It
is a common assumption made by apologists, which Radin observes
is “not validated in practice to any significant extent” and which
demonstrates a “breathtaking coup of armchair economics.”23
Ben-Shahar argues that people have varying preferences for legal
rights. Some may sell their rights cheaply, others at a greater discount, and a few not at all. He argues that market-inalienability
would prevent firms from price differentiating to reflect these preferences. But most vendors do not now price differentiate based upthat its services are “free and always will be.” See www.facebook.com/. A duty to
draft reasonably would seek specific assent to sword and crook provisions but
require only notice of shield provisions.
21
Radin at 155.
22
Id. at 159.
23
Id. at 290-291, fn. 21.
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on legal rights. Companies may offer variable pricing, but almost
always it pertains to the product itself and not to ancillary legal
rights. Furthermore, this argument does not respond to Radin’s
central argument that some rights should not be saleable.
According to Ben-Shahar, mandating certain terms would lead to
regressive cross-subsidies. He uses as an example privacy policies,
which he argues are a concern of the “sophisticated elite” but that
most people could not afford the increased cost that would presumably result if data collection were restricted or prohibited. But this
claim is unfounded. In fact, it may be that the sophisticated elite are
simply better informed about the consequences than the majority of
consumers. Perhaps if the majority of consumers understood how
their data was being collected and used, they would object (or be
willing to pay more to do business with companies with less intrusive data collection policies). Will the collection of data mean that
less wealthy consumers won’t be able to get a mortgage in the future?
That they will be turned down for health insurance? That they won’t
get the job they want? If it did, and consumers knew that it did, it
would be safe to say that most consumers would care and that many
would pay more to protect their information. The lack of transparency (What do companies do with our information anyway? What will
they do with it in the future?) and heuristic biases make it hard to
make generalizations about consumer preferences. In addition, BenShahar’s approach ignores the effect that greater transparency has on
shaping public opinion. The majority of consumers may not be willing to pay more for privacy now, but that doesn’t mean they won’t
in the future if they understood how their information is used.
Ben-Shahar presents a picture of consumers lining up outside of
an Apple store the day the iPhone 5 was launched. He states that it
is “not a picture of market failure, nor of gullible consumers divested of their rights.” But the fact that many consumers love the iPhone
reveals nothing about Apple’s contract. If – as Ben-Shahar admits –
few consumers read boilerplate, the number of people outside of
Apple’s stores is not indicative of their feelings about Apple’s boilerplate. They don’t love Apple despite its boilerplate, they love Apple products without regard for its boilerplate.
SPRING 2014  
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Furthermore, what choice do these consumers have? Some might
be willing to buy a Samsung Galaxy instead of an iPhone 5 if it had
better boilerplate terms. The problem is that the Samsung Galaxy
doesn’t have better boilerplate terms. There is no need for companies to compete on boilerplate because nobody knows what it says
and everyone assumes that it says the same thing.

A

CONCLUSION  
ccording to Ben-Shahar, “Radin’s argument poses two challenges for the boilerplate apologist”:

The first challenge is the problem of ignorance – how can people be obligated to terms that are impossible to know and appreciate in advance? How could such terms match their preferences? The second challenge is the problem of intolerable terms
– why should baseline legal entitlements be replaced with harsh
one-sided arrangements?

His arguments, however, answer another question: Is boilerplate
socially beneficial? Rather than acknowledging the lack of alternatives, the forced choices, and the judicial construction of consent, he
discusses economic justifications for the reallocation of entitlements. But he bases these justifications upon conjectures and, compelling and insightful though they may be, they do not answer the
question – Does consent matter all the time? Are there some rights
that should not be saleable and if so, which ones? More importantly,
who decides?
Despite their differences, Radin and Ben-Shahar share a similar
view of boilerplate – it is not a contract. A contract depends upon
consent – this is not wishful thinking on the part of idealistic autonomists but the core tenet of contract law. The difference is that Radin believes that it matters that boilerplate is not a contract and BenShahar does not. Ben-Shahar seems to adopt the view, So what if it is
not a contract? For Ben-Shahar, the important question isn’t why
boilerplate is contractual but whether it should nonetheless be enforced because it is socially beneficial. Ben-Shahar’s arguments in
302  
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favor of boilerplate presume to know what the consumer would
prefer rather than seeking ways to enable the individual to make
better choices for herself.
But a contract’s validity depends upon consent, not conjecture
about what consumers would or should want. Without consent,
boilerplate that reallocates rights is not a contract – it is a taking.
The pervasiveness of boilerplate makes consent in the mass consumer context – actual consent, not legally constructed consent – fantastical. Companies use fine print, legalese, and excess verbiage
which render their contracts incomprehensible to most people (including lawyers). There should be no “duty to read” without a “duty
to draft reasonably.” The expectation that consumers read all the
fine print thrust their way is unreasonable, especially when there is
no similar expectation that businesses present and draft their contracts so they are readable.
Technology has exacerbated matters. Boilerplate insinuates itself
on all of our digital devices. It comes between us and every company we do business with online. These terms often incorporate hyperlinked pages by reference, creating a disruptive reading experience for consumers. To make matters worse, these terms often incorporate “modification at will” clauses which require consumers to
read the terms each time they visit the website. The benefit of
standard forms was supposed to be that they were efficient, but it is
hardly efficient or rational for the consumer to read every contract
she encounters online, every time she ventures online. The social
cost would be overwhelming if consumers read every contract presented to them. So the consumer does what any rational actor
would do – clicks “agree” without reading and surrender to the oppressive contracting environment.
But companies are not the primary culprits here – they are
merely exploiting the advantage that the courts have given them.
Courts fail to consider how, in the aggregate, mass consumer contracts create a coercive contracting environment. They construct
assent through actions which are divorced from meaning or intent
by the actor, such as clicking to remove an obstruction. If no one
reads wrap contracts, how can courts find a “reasonable person”
SPRING 2014  
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would have done so? How can a definition of reasonable contracting
behavior be so removed from the way people actually behave?
The enforceability of boilerplate should depend first of all upon
the quality of consent. Courts now construe consent as a conclusion
– either the consumer did or did not consent to the contract. But
consent is non-linear and, as Radin writes, occupies “a continuum
from clear consent to clear nonconsent.”24 It is also scattershot, and
variable. A consumer may consent to some things (the price, the
return policy) but not others (the non-disparagement clause, the
refund policies). Contract doctrine has always recognized this continuum through doctrines like unconscionability and mistake – but
courts have sometimes been reluctant to apply them. The problems
of boilerplate cannot be so easily divided into autonomist and consequentialist silos given the limits of human cognition, and the problems with the current judicial construction of consent.
The better question then is how to improve the quality of consent? This can be done by making important information more salient by imposing a duty to draft reasonably along with a requirement
of specific assent to provisions that reallocate rights or assign unallocated rights. Increasing salience, both in terms of noticeability and
relevance, through reasonable drafting is one way to improve the
quality of consent. Noticeability and relevance can interrelate;25 as
previously noted, making it easier for consumers to compare SUV
rollovers made consumers care more about the issue of rollovers.
Courts should also recognize that consent is less vital for some
terms than for others. It doesn’t matter whether a shopper “consents” to a store’s “NO SMOKING” policy – it’s within the store’s
rights to impose it or eject the shopper. Similarly, it doesn’t matter
whether Facebook’s users consent to its policy that users shall not

24
25

Id. at 158.
See, for example, OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACTS: LAW, ECONOMICS
AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012). Bar-Gill proposes disclosure
requirements to help consumers make better decisions about cellphone contracts,
mortgages and credit card contracts.
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bully or post pornographic materials.26 Facebook can impose that
conduct limitation without users’ consent.
A proprietor’s rights, however, are not boundless. A consumer
may consent to a store’s prominently displayed “NO RETURN ON
SALE ITEMS” policy but not the provision buried in the notice that
returns on all products are subject to a $20 restocking fee. A storeowner has certain proprietorship rights with respect to her store or
business, but other ownership rights are unclear or belong to the
consumer. In some areas, the law is unclear about who owns rights,
such as the right to personal information. Provisions affecting unallocated rights, or reallocating rights, should require specific assent. A
storeowner does not have the right to charge a $20 restocking fee
without consent because that $20 belongs to the consumer. Similarly,
Facebook’s users presumably own their personal data and it is unclear
whether Facebook has the right to use it without user permission.
Courts should replace the notion of blanket assent with specific
assent and presumed assent requirements, depending on the nature
of the provision. A specific assent requirement increases salience
while a presumed assent requirement acknowledges that not all
terms require consent. A more nuanced, specific assent/presumed
assent analysis would render contracts more readable while more
evenly balancing the benefits and burdens of boilerplate between the
consumer and the drafting company.
Radin’s book prompts another important question that the apologist response deflects and that is, Are there rights that are so fundamental to society that we should not allow individuals to waive them? While
Ben-Shahar refers to Radin as an autonomist, her argument regarding market inalienability is in fact a significant limitation on the ability of an individual to make decisions that affect legal rights affecting
important societal values. The issue of inalienability forces us to ask,
Are there certain rights that should not be subject to contract? Even with
consent? And if so, how to determine which ones and, importantly,
who should decide? These are important questions which require
26

Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, available at www.facebook.com
/legal/terms.
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consideration of the long term consequences to society, not only the
short term costs or benefits to individual consumers. Ben-Shahar’s
response weighs the economic benefits of boilerplate, but does so
without considering non-economic concerns. Yet social, political,
behavioral, and economic issues are intertwined, and cost is a complicated calculation that includes more than what’s listed on a price
tag. Discussions about the benefit of economic policies should not
occur in a vacuum if the objective is maximizing consumer welfare.
A serious discussion about boilerplate’s effect on consumers
must also consider the useful functions it serves for businesses and,
by extension, society. U.S. contracts might compare unfavorably
with those in more regulated, consumer-friendly countries, but then
again, in many of those same countries, social norms and legislation
limit a business’s potential liability for damages and restrict the ability to bring class-action lawsuits. The problem of boilerplate cannot
be resolved without taking into account the liability that businesses
might be asked to bear without it and the impact that such a burden
might have on the economy and innovation. Given our litigious culture, I am not willing to throw the boilerplate baby out with the
bathwater, however dirty it may be. Any regulation of boilerplate
terms would have to consider limitations on companies’ liabilities
and the possibility of consumer (or attorney) opportunism. Yet, the
current judicial trend discounts too heavily opportunism by businesses in exploiting their contractual advantage.
Although I can’t here answer the question of what rights should
be inalienable (primarily because rendering rights inalienable requires a case-by-case substantive inquiry), I believe the issue of market inalienability is directly tied to the quality of consent: The better
the quality of consent, the smaller the sphere of inalienability.27 Similarly, the more inferior the quality of consent, the more protection
required and the greater the sphere of market inalienability.
27

In an ideal world, equally matched (resources, information, emotional wellbeing) individuals with the same socio-political-economic status should be able to
allocate their rights without intervention from the state. But we don’t live in a
perfect world.
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There are ways to enhance the quality of consent by making the
process of contracting better and fairer. One way is to acknowledge
contracting realities such as context and presentation. Judges should
acknowledge their own experiences to admit that, Yes, they don’t
read boilerplate either,28 and No, that doesn’t make them unreasonable. The burden should not be upon the non-drafter to read a contract that no “real” reasonable person would read.
On the other hand, a failure to read should not excuse adherents
from every obligation in every circumstance. In the context of
standard form contracts, it may even be that whether an adherent
consented is the wrong inquiry. Because of the all-or-nothing nature
of assent, too much rides on the outcome of such an inquiry. A finding of “consent” means that all terms are included; a finding of “no
consent” means that no terms are included. Consent should not be
required for every contractual provision, but for certain provisions
consent should not be constructed or implied, but specifically and
actually granted.
While I continue to believe that contract law has the potential to
address many of boilerplate’s ills, it is the judiciary that gives me
pause. Cases like ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg29 bend doctrinal rules in
favor of businesses, making consent more attenuated than when
standard form contracts first made their efficient entrance. Too
many courts have become enamored of apologist conjectures without
regard to the coercive contracting environment faced by consumers.
They consider the business and economic benefits of boilerplate
without acknowledging the hardships to consumers. They ignore
that there is so much more that businesses can do to make their contracts more noticeable, more understandable and more reasonable.

28

Judge Richard Posner of the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals revealed that he didn’t
read the hundreds of pages for his home equity loan before signing the contract.
Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Posner Admits He Didn’t Read Boilerplate for Home Equity
Loan, ABA JOURNAL, June 23, 2010, available at www.abajournal.com/news/
article/judge_posner_admits_he_didnt_read_boilerplate_for_home_equity_loan/.
29
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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